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DRAFT 
 
 
Abstract 
The power of financial industry groups is a subject of widespread academic and 
public debate. Existing international political economy (IPE) research has 
highlighted how different resources, institutions and structural features allow 
financial industry groups to influence financial regulatory policymaking. In so 
doing, however, this literature routinely tends to neglect the wider array of 
interest groups beyond the particular financial industry groups being regulated. 
Actor plurality is usually assumed to be low or inconsequential. Such an 
assumption obscures the important role that actor plurality may play in the 
policymaking process. We present new quantitative and qualitative evidence 
demonstrating how global financial regulatory politics is more plural than most 
existing depictions would suggest. Actor plurality can have significant effects in 
‘leveraging’ the influence of financial industry groups which are often able to tie 
their interests with those of other private sector groups affected indirectly by the 
regulation in question. We illustrate this underappreciated facet of financial 
industry power through a variety of case-based evidence from the formation of 
banking and derivatives rules in various jurisdictions, both before and after the 
global financial crisis of 2008-2009.  
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The recent global financial crisis has contributed to a resurgence of interest in financial 
sector industry groups such as banks, credit rating agencies, and hedge funds, and the influence 
these groups and their associations exercise over the shape of contemporary financial regulation. 
Conjectures regarding the power of these groups are widespread within the international political 
economy (IPE) literature, and numerous authors have debated how different resources, 
institutions and structural features of contemporary economies enable financial industry groups 
to influence the regulations to which they are subject.   
Such attempts by IPE scholars to explain the power and influence of the financial 
industry on regulatory outcomes have traditionally concentrated their analysis on a rather narrow 
set of financial sector actors. An implicit, and often untested, assumption informing most of the 
literature is that collective action problems, resource and information asymmetries, and 
exclusionary institutional contexts constrain the plurality of actors involved in the financial 
regulatory policymaking process. As a result, most depictions represent the financial regulatory 
domain as a very non-plural place, dominated by a few all-powerful financial industry groups 
influencing regulation they are subject to at will, while other non-financial actors have been 
assumed away and left absent from most analyses. 
Contrary to this perspective, in this article we contend that the mobilization of a plurality 
of private sector groups both inside and outside of the financial sector is a key characteristic of 
the financial regulatory policymaking and an important factor in affecting the policy-shaping 
power of financial industry groups. When financial firms are targeted by a regulatory policy, their 
lobbying campaigns are often able to tie their interests to those of other private sector groups 
affected indirectly by the regulation in question and to form coalitions helps them to amplify – or 
‘leverage’ – their influence over the regulatory policymaking process. Yet such leverage, we 
contend, comes not only with benefits but also, occasionally, with risks as well. Although the 
influence of financial industry groups can be enhanced through coalitions, it is weakened if non-
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target groups mobilize against their regulatory preferences. Acknowledging the wider plurality of 
actors in financial regulatory lobbying in this way can give us a richer sense of how financial 
industry power actually operates and its limits. 
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 1, we review the existing literature on the 
power of financial industry groups over the design of financial regulatory policies, and highlight 
the assumption of the lack of plurality within financial regulatory policymaking. In Section 2, we 
explore this assumption by explicating a quantitative analysis of which groups mobilize in 
response to regulatory policy proposals, using data from national and international policy 
consultations in both finance and other regulated sectors. The rest of the paper explores the 
implications of this actor plurality for financial regulatory politics and the influence of financial 
industry groups in this domain. Section 3 lays out the theoretical motivations for conceptualizing 
the influence of financial industry groups as leveraged and conditional on the mobilization of 
other groups within and outside the financial industry. The impact of this mobilization over the 
power of financial industry groups is then explored in Section 4 through qualitative case-based 
evidence of financial regulatory lobbying in the domain of banking and derivatives regulation. 
 
 
Section 1 - Financial Industry Power and the Plurality in the Financial Regulatory 
Policymaking 
  
In recent years, a large body of IPE literature has emerged which seeks to investigate the 
influence that the financial industry exercise over the regulatory policymaking process. Scholars 
from varying analytical perspectives have described this influence as extensive and systematic, as 
highlighted by the frequent reference to the term ‘regulatory capture’. This concept originally 
developed by the economist George Stigler (1971) in his work on the regulation of the trucking 
industry has frequently been used by scholars of financial governance to convey the notion that 
the financial industry groups who were to be regulated routinely make policy, rather than take 
policy at the expense of consumers and the general public (see e.g. Baker 2010; Ocampo 2009:10; 
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Tsingou 2008). A variety of different perspectives have been put forward to seek to explain this 
predominance. 
First, a great deal of scholarship emphasizes the significant lobbying resources available 
to financial firm and associations, emphasizing the concentration of wealth within the financial 
sector being used to buy superior access to policymakers or to simply protect the industry from 
regulatory costs (Igan, Mishra, and Tressel 2009; Johnson and Kwak 2010). It is also widely 
acknowledged that money is not the only resource that financial industry groups possess in 
abundance. The private information possessed by financial industry groups, and their use of 
technical expertise are also seen as particularly valuable resources to shape regulatory policies in a 
highly technical and complex domain such as financial regulation, where regulatory authorities 
are often at risk of becoming “captive of knowledge specialists” (Lindblom 1977:120, cited in 
Tsingou 2006:172; see also Cerny 1994:331; Underhill and Zhang 2008:553).  
Second, attempts to make sense of the power of the financial industry have also drawn 
scholarly attention to the institutional context in which financial regulation is designed and 
implemented. A central claim in this regard is that the formal independence of financial 
regulatory agencies in most jurisdictions disguises the privileged access to regulators enjoyed by 
the financial industry they regulate and oversee. Some scholars have focused on the formal 
institutional context, such as the mandate of regulatory agencies, their internal governance 
structure, or the often opaque and discretionary environment within which regulators and 
regulated firms interact (Underhill and Zhang 2008, Barth Caprio, and Levine 2012). Others have 
instead emphasized the role of informal institutions, such as the so-called “revolving doors” 
between individuals from the financial industry and regulatory agencies and their impact in 
fostering the emergence of like-minded policy communities (Braun and Raddatz 2010, Tsingou 
2008; Johnson and Kwak 2010).  
The third set of arguments deployed tends to stress what might be called the structural 
power of financial industry groups (Fuchs 2007). In particular, a broad range of research utilizing 
the concept of “financialization” has highlighted the increased importance of financial sector 
accumulation since the 1970s in the operation of the domestic and international economy 
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(Epstein 2005; Montgomerie 2008; Krippner 2012). The globalization of financial flows is 
understood as underwriting this structural power by constraining the policy environment in a way 
that benefits the interests of financial industry groups (Gill and Law 1989; Andrews 1994; 
Sharman 2010:15). Because of the central position of finance in the global economy, 
policymakers are wary of introducing policies that may disrupt the “golden goose” of financial 
sector accumulation, and they are more likely to listen to the concerns of financial industry 
groups than to those of firms in other sectors (Baker 2013). 
Yet, even among the diversity of these perspectives, there is a certain ontological unity 
regarding the actors to be analyzed. IPE scholarship on financial regulation has centered 
predominantly on the specific financial industry group targeted for regulation, in isolation from 
the rest of the financial sector and indeed from the rest of the business sector in general. For 
instance, numerous studies which have investigated the evolution of the international regime for 
banking regulation have focused on the lobbying activities of banks and banking associations 
over the members of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (Wood 2005; Oatley and 
Nabors 1998; Singer 2007; Lall 2012, Young 2012). Interest groups outside of the financial 
industry were described by Helleiner and Porter as “almost entirely absent from the consultative 
process” that led to the formulation of the international Basel II agreement (Helleiner and Porter 
2010:20). Studies that have examined the evolution of the European financial regulatory 
architecture have denounced the over-representation of large financial industry groups and the 
“under-representation of other societal stakeholders” (Mügge 2010:9). Scholte (2013) has argued 
that the involvement of NGOs, labour unions, faith-based organizations, consumer associations, 
and other social movements in response to the global financial crisis has remained sporadic and 
weak in comparison with the large advocacy campaigns that characterize other issues such as 
environment, human rights, poverty and trade, while financial industry interests have dominated 
(Scholte 2013). This tendency of theorizing financial regulatory politics as one where “plurality of 
active participation is severely restricted” (Baker 2009:198) stands in stark contrast to other areas 
of IPE scholarship such as international trade (Rogowski 1990), global environmental 
governance (Falkner 2007; Clapp 2005; Orsini 2011), exchange rate policy (Frieden 2002, 
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Henning 1994), global food governance (Clapp and Helleiner 2012) and energy governance (Levy 
and Kolk 2002), where competition between a plurality of actors has been acknowledge as 
important component in shape policy outcomes. 
 Indeed, this characterization of financial regulatory policymaking as a non-plural place is 
consistent with a number of seminal works within the political science literature. As Mancur 
Olson has argued, it is often not rational for firms and individuals not directly affected by a 
regulatory policy to participate in a group pursuing collective goods such as policies promoting 
financial stability (Olson 1965). On the contrary, concentrated groups of producers directly 
targeted for regulation have been described by Stigler as having in built structural advantages that 
make it easier to overcome the free-riding problem (Stigler 1971). In the case of financial 
regulation in particular, the incentives for stakeholders not directly targeted by a piece of 
regulation to engage in collective action are further weakened by the diffuse distribution of costs 
associated with lax prudential regulatory policies (Wilson 1980), which will be borne by a large 
number of taxpayers and manifest themselves over the long-term in the form of financial 
instability. Some of the more specific features of global financial regulation emphasized by the 
IPE literature might further dissuade actor plurality: non-target groups might not have the 
financial firepower or the specialized knowledge required to closely monitor or even react to 
financial regulatory processes (Baker 2010; Scholte 2013). The same features of the institutional 
environment that privilege the access of financial industry groups are perceived as barriers 
constraining the mobilization of other groups who can’t ‘break into’ the closed policy network 
that characterizes financial governance (Mattli and Woods 2009). 
However, there are important reasons to expand our horizons in IPE of finance 
scholarship beyond the financial industry targeted for regulation. Recent studies of lobbying in 
the US have put into question the extent to which the logic of collective action represents 
significant obstacles to the plurality of interest groups mobilizing in the vast majority of issue 
areas (see Baumgartner et al. 2009, Godwin et al. 2012, 148). In the case of financial regulatory 
policies, the incentives for a plurality of groups to mobilize are further enhanced by the highly 
unique features of the resource that is being regulated, namely credit. The centrality of finance to 
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the rest of the economy means that financial regulatory decisions will have significant spillover 
effects not only over public goods such as financial stability, but also on more private goods such 
as availability of credit flowing to different sectors of the economy as well as to low-income 
groups (a dynamic explored within IPE by Seabrooke 2006). As a result, we can expect financial 
regulatory proposals to solicit a response from other private sector actors, such as corporate end-
users of financial services, financial counterparties, and indeed the multiplicity of business actors 
that depend on flows of credit, which are less likely to be victim of collective action problems 
than the general public. Free-riding on the mobilization of the financial industry groups targeted 
for regulation would be rational only in those circumstances where their respective set of 
preferences completely converge on every issue, an unlikely event given the often 
multidimensional character of financial regulatory policies.  
The question of whether the incentives to mobilize might outweigh the costs highlighted 
by the existing literature is fundamentally an empirical issue. Yet the IPE literature on financial 
regulation has so far failed to provide a more systematic assessment of this plurality of private 
sector actors and its consequences over the design of regulatory policies – a surprising absence 
given the centrality of finance in contemporary economic life. In the section which follows below 
we seek to address this gap by devising an empirical strategy to assess actor plurality in financial 
regulatory politics. 
 
 
 
Section 2 - How Plural is Financial Regulatory Policymaking? 
 
 
How plural is financial regulatory politics? To answer this question we generated a new 
dataset composed of the publicly available written responses to a wide range of policy 
consultations. In recent years, it has become common for regulatory agencies across the world in 
finance and other sectors to open regulatory proposals to formal consultative processes. From 
the perspective of regulators, responses to such consultations provide important technical 
feedback as well as a much-needed source of systematic information about private sector 
sentiment over policies and about the possible impact that the regulatory policy may have over 
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different groups. Private sector groups have a strong incentive to contribute to consultative 
processes in order to shape policies, as well as to leave a record of their positions. For this 
reason, data from these policy consultations is therefore widely deemed as valuable in the interest 
group literature (Préfontaine et al. 2010; Yackee and Yackee 2006; Godwin et al. 2012).  
Policy consultations do not represent the only mechanism available for advocacy that 
frequently occurs behind closed-doors, and they do not allow us to weight the relative 
importance of individual respondents. However, these written responses to policy consultations 
do nevertheless provide a relatively systematic ‘trace’ of what actors tend to mobilize in response 
to different regulatory proposals and serve as a useful proxy indicator for actor plurality in 
financial regulatory policymaking. 
We selected a wide variety of consultations on financial regulatory policy taking place 
between 1996 to 2012, at both national and international levels of governance. National-level 
consultations include countries characterized by very diverse institutional contexts and diversity 
in in the role played by the financial sector, covering Canada, Germany, the United Kingdom and 
the United States. In addition to these national-level consultations, we included consultations 
conducted at the European Union level as well as those conducted by the transnational 
regulatory bodies widely discussed within the IPE of finance literature, such as the Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision and the International Organization of Securities 
Commissions (IOSCO). In order to assess the potential uniqueness of private sector mobilization 
in the case of financial regulation, we also selected variety of consultations around regulatory 
policies concerning other sectors of the economy.  In this regard, we selected consultations 
within the energy sector, health care and pharmaceuticals, agriculture, and the telecoms and 
information services industry. In total we collected and coded 20,235 responses to 562 different 
policy consultations across finance and these other sectors, covering a total of 63 different 
governance bodies (for list see the Appendix). For each comment letter in our dataset, we coded 
the identity of the authoring group, differentiating respondents who were from business groups 
from those groups in the trade union movement, consumer protection organizations, research 
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institutions, and NGOs. Table 1 below provides a breakdown of the different kinds of groups 
responding to policy consultations which target business activity in different regulated sectors. 
 
Table 1: Percentage of Respondents to Consultations in Different Regulated Areas 
Respondent Agriculture Energy Telecoms Health Finance 
Business Groups 78.41 84.02 93.14 78.03 89.07 
Trade Unions 1.82 1.13 1.06 0.30 1.24 
Consumer Protection 0.62 0.88 0.92 2.03 0.95 
Research Institutions 4.80 3.82 1.41 9.08 2.97 
NGOs 14.36 10.15 3.47 10.57 5.76 
No. of Letters Coded 
3,566 3,191 1,414 2,086 10,965 
 
Such a ‘bird’s eye view’ of interest group mobilization across a range of regulated sectors 
provides some empirical support to those claims within existing IPE literature regarding the 
“exclusionary” nature of the financial regulatory policymaking. Indeed, Table 1 illustrates that 
respondents to financial sector consultations tend to be more dominated by business groups than 
other sectors (the exception being policy consultations in the telecoms sector).2 Yet while 
consultations targeting finance are associated with low proportions of respondents from trade 
unions and consumer protection groups, this appears to be a relative mainstay of most regulated 
sectors.  Where financial consultations appear to be distinct (along with telecom consultations) is 
with respect to the relatively low mobilization of NGOs. This provides empirical support the 
predominant view within the existing literature regarding the limited participation of non-
business groups in financial regulatory debates. At the same, Table 1 suggests that this 
participation gap is not dramatically different from other areas. 
What is missing from the data of Table 1 and from most analysis of the mobilization 
surrounding financial regulatory policymaking is a better understanding of the different kinds of 
                                                             
2 Our sample of letters is larger for finance than for other sectors, however tests with multiple random 
sampling yielded very similar distributional results. 
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business groups that mobilize around regulatory policymaking. In order to better differentiate the 
plurality of actors within the business community, we disaggregated the respondents to policy 
consultations according to the economic location of each respondent within a spectrum of 53 
different economic categories, across 9 different sectors of the economy.3 For each consultation, 
we identified the specific categories of groups who were the intended target of the regulation. 
This allowed us to code for each letter submitted to a consultation whether or not this group was 
being directly targeted for regulation (the ‘target’), whether it was within the same sector as the 
primary targeted group (‘sectoral co-habitant’), and whether it was outside the sector of the 
targeted group altogether (‘outsider). Thus for example in the case of a consultation on banking 
regulation, a bank respondent is coded as a target, but a mutual fund or insurance company is 
considered a sectoral co-habitant, while agricultural associations or manufacturing firms are 
coded outsiders.  
 
Table 2: Sectoral Diversity of Business Respondents in Different Regulated Areas, as Percentage of Total 
Business Respondents 
 
Respondent Agriculture Energy Telecoms Health Finance 
Targets 83.98 69.79 84.06 68.72 51.70 
Sectoral Cohabitants 5.26 10.29 11.31 20.66 24.79 
Outsiders 10.77 19.92 4.63 10.62 23.51 
 
 
What Table 2 suggests is that, when we break down business respondents across sectors and 
industries, nearly half of all business respondents are non-target groups from inside and outside 
finance. Moreover, the respondents to consultations around financial regulatory policies tend to 
be more highly differentiated within the business community than those responding to consultations 
targeting non-financial groups. Thus while the regulation of finance is associated with 
considerably less participation by non-business groups such as NGOs or trade unions, this 
dominance of business stakeholders should not be mistaken for lack of plurality since the 
participation of business groups that are not directly targeted by the regulation is significantly 
                                                             
3 This categorization was created in an attempt to correspond as best as possible to sectoral categories of 
standard industry classification schemes used in actual accounting taxonomies of the economy, such as the 
North American Industry Classification Scheme (NAICS), and the International Standard Industrial 
Classification of All Economic Activities of the United Nations. 
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higher than in other sectors. More ‘outsiders’, i.e. groups not belonging to the economic sector 
being regulated, mobilize in response to financial sector consultations than any other sector. The 
only area where the mobilization of outsiders come close to the level of financial regulatory 
policies is the regulation of the energy sector, a sector that, interestingly, also provides 
‘infrastructural’ resources foundational to the operation of the rest of the economy. 
 
 
Section 3 - Why Actor Plurality Matters 
 
If financial regulation is characterized by more actor plurality than existing IPE literature 
seems to suggest, what consequences does this have for financial regulatory politics and the 
influence of financial industry groups in this domain?  The importance of the plurality of interest 
groups in shaping regulatory policies has a long pedigree in the political science and political 
economy literature. Since Stigler, economic theories of regulation even within the Chicago-
School tradition in which he was working, have recognized that outright regulatory capture was 
unlikely given dynamics such as the preferences of consumers (Peltzman 1976) and other 
pressure groups competing for influence (Becker 1983). A variety of nationally-focused studies 
have built upon this literature and traced the origins of different aspects of US banking regulation 
since the 19th century such bank usury laws and branch banking restrictions in the preferences 
and strength not only of incumbents within the banking industry but also of competing financial 
industries such as insurance firms, consumers of financial services, and large industrial firms 
(Rajan and Zingales 2003; Benmelech and Moskowitz 2010; Kroszner and Strahan 1999; Abrams 
and Settle 1993) While these national statistically-focused studies offer important evidence in the 
form of a diffuse pattern over time, their focus has remain limited mostly to the US, while 
overlooking the international policymaking. Most importantly, these studies have overlooked the 
characteristics of the engagement of different interest groups in the policymaking process and 
their interaction in shaping regulation. 
This has instead been a longstanding theme in American politics since the emergence of 
the pluralist paradigm (e.g. see Truman 1951; Dahl 1961; more recently see Lowery and Gray 
2004; Baumgartner et al. 2009; for a review see Godwin et al. 2013). A variety of IPE scholarship 
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has taken up either implicitly or explicitly Lindblom’s (1977) moniker of ‘Neo-Pluralism” to the 
study of interest groups, conceptualizing the policymaking process as ‘tug-of-war’ among a 
plurality of organized interests lobbying policymakers on competing sides (see Falkner 2010; 
Cerny 2010; Mattli and Woods 2009).  
As we have emphasized earlier, this attention to interest group plurality seems to be 
largely missing within the IPE of financial regulation literature. With some important exceptions 
(e.g. Fioretos 2010; Helleiner and Clapp 2012; Woll 2013), most existing IPE scholarship has 
presented the financial industry as a rather cohesive group. When the financial sector is 
differentiated at all in existing scholarship, this is primarily in terms of rivalries within the same 
financial industry (Mügge 2006), differences across the national contexts in which financial 
industry groups are embedded (Singer 2007; Woll 2013; Seabrooke 2006; Quaglia 2008), along 
different ‘varieties of capitalism’ (Macartney 2009). Such differentiation is important in many 
circumstances, but this perspective does not capture the plurality of actors within and outside the 
financial industry that may operate within the same institutional context.  
We propose that actor plurality matters in financial regulatory politics because it affects 
the ability for the regulated financial industry group to get what it wants in the policymaking 
process. Actor plurality may translate into inter-group conflict, whereby a regulated financial 
industry group may have its influence over the policymaking process reduced; alternatively a 
financial industry group’s influence can be ‘leveraged’ by the existence of supportive coalitions of 
groups that share similar preferences.  
The possibility that a plurality of heterogeneous and potentially competing interests 
groups may join forces in coalitions has become a central aspect of contemporary interest group 
politics, as highlighted by a number of authors which have explored this phenomenon (Hojnacki 
1997; Hula 1999; Mahoney 2008; Baumgartner et. al. 2009; Holyoke 2011).4 In the financial 
regulatory context, formal coalitions are relatively common across groups from different financial 
                                                             
4 With respect to this literature, our understanding of ‘coalitions’ is intentionally a broad one, which 
includes both formal coalitions where a plurality of interest groups establish formal structures (e.g. paid 
staff, an office, letterhead) and pledge resources, as well as instances whereby groups can be found 
lobbying on the same “sides” of a proposed piece of regulation (see Baumgartner et. al. 2009). 
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industries (e.g. the International Swaps and Derivatives Associations has banks, securities firms, 
and insurance firms as their members) but more rare between financial and non-financial groups 
(for an exception, see the Confederation of British Industry). Instead, collaboration between 
financial and non-financial groups is instead more likely to emerge around discrete issue areas 
and remain relatively informal, with the different groups sharing information, develop common 
positions, and coordinate their lobbying strategies in pursuit of similar policy goals without 
creating formal structures (Mahoney 2008: 168; Godwin et al. 2012).  
In these cases, the financial firms more directly targeted by a regulatory initiative are 
more likely to play the role of “coalition leaders”, seeking to organize the efforts of other groups 
less directly affected by a regulation (Hula 1999, p. 124). These groups are more likely join a 
coalition only to achieve a specific private good or desire to appear active on a given issue 
without necessarily devoting significant resources. Indeed, the financial groups most directly 
targeted by a regulation will often subsidize the participation of ‘tagalong’ groups (Mahoney 
2008: 168) by strategically providing information regarding the impact of a piece of regulation 
over their activities.  
In order to explain why financial industry groups may devote resources towards this 
coalition-building activity is important to analyze the benefits that these groups accrue from the 
mobilization of other groups lobbying from the same side of a proposed piece of regulation. It is 
possible to identify three mechanisms through which financial industry influence is amplified by 
the mobilization of these groups. 
First, different authors have suggested that coalitions provide a low-cost way for groups 
to expand their lobbying efforts by pooling advocacy resources. This includes both financial 
resources directed towards lobbying policymakers, as well as nontangible resources such as 
intelligence, expertise, and political information (Hula 1999; Hojnacki 1998). Coalitions with 
groups from other industries and sectors are of larger informational value that groups that 
remains within closely knit social circles (Carpenter, Esterling, and Lazer 1998). In the case of 
financial regulation where targeted financial groups often already enjoy an advantage vis-a-vis 
other groups in their financial resources and technical expertise, mobilizing other groups may 
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serve to bring a wider spectrum of advocacy resources to the (lobbying) table. Examples of 
complementary resources that targeted financial industry groups can mobilize through coalitions 
are for instance the mass membership or support that small business associations and citizen 
groups can mobilize, or the employment generating capacity of large non-financial corporates 
(Josselin and Wallace 2002).  
A second reason why coalitions may affect financial industry power has to do with the 
access to the policymaking process. The access that different groups will have to the 
policymaking process is influenced not only from their individual properties but also from the 
position that they occupy within a communication network (Beyers and Braun-Poppellars 2013). 
Joining forces with groups from different sectors allow a targeted financial group to gain political 
contacts and to increase its capacity to establish new privileged channel of access to the 
policymaking process. This channel of influence is particularly valuable in those cases when the 
central location of the policymaking process shift from regulatory agencies at the national and 
transnational level to whom financial industry groups may have a privileged access towards 
government branches, parliamentary committees, or competing regulatory agencies that might 
otherwise be less receptive to the demands of financial lobbies and more receptive to the claims 
of the non-financial groups (Clapp and Helleiner 2012).   
A third and final reason why coalitions can be expected to affect the ability of financial 
industry groups to influence regulation has to do with their capacity to function as a signaling 
device. The capacity of the financial industry groups to generate a broader coalition can convey 
information to policymakers about the widespread support of their claims and regarding whether 
opposing the proposal could prove to be detrimental for them in the future (Hula 1999). This 
signal is even stronger when financial groups are capable to recruit “strange bedfellow coalitions” 
(Mahoney 2008:175) such as traditionally opposing interests or groups that transcend the 
financial sector altogether.  The incentives for the firm targeted by the regulation to build 
coalitions in order to signal broader support for its preferences is particularly strong in the 
aftermath of crises that increase the receptiveness of policymakers to cues about public support 
for different regulatory measures (Mahoney 2008: 170; Culpepper 2011). The ability of financial 
14 
 
interests to tie their concerns to the social concerns of a broader range of stakeholders can 
contribute towards legitimizing their demands and secure additional political support (such a 
dynamic is exemplified in Seabrooke 2006, pp. 112, 130).  
 
While the diversity of private sector mobilization can enhance financial industry power, 
this relationship is not a linear one. The mobilization of non-target groups can, under some 
circumstances, also damage lobbying power when non-target groups, whether within the financial 
sector or otherwise, mobilize in opposition to the demands of the target group. Such 
‘countervailing groups’ or instances of ‘business conflict’ (Lindblom 1977; Falkner 2007) can act 
to diminish the relative power of the targeted financial industry groups’ resources and the 
credibility of their claims. Many NGOs, consumer groups, or public interest groups have 
traditionally entered financial regulatory debates calling for more stringent regulatory policies to 
reduce the risks of financial crisis, thus frequently entering on a collision course with the interests 
of those regulated financial groups seeking to minimize their regulatory burden. However, the 
preferences are more ambiguous in the case of other actors such as corporate actors which rely 
on financial firms for the provision of credit and risk-management services. 
 
 While in the medium-term these firms would benefit from more stringent regulatory 
policies capable to mitigate the recurrence of financial crises and the costs these pose to the real 
economy, their preferences may be different in the short term. Some corporate firms may 
support more stringent regulation to reduce fluctuations and volatility in those markets affecting 
their business operations (Clapp and Helleiner 2012). However, others non-financial corporates 
may prefer less stringent financial regulatory policies in order to reduce the risk that the 
regulatory burden may trickle down and increase the costs of credit or costs of hedging their 
commercial risks (Pagliari and Young 2013). The likelihood of the preferences of these other 
groups converging with those of the financial industry targeted for regulation, will be influenced 
by a number of context-specific factors, such as the characteristic of the national financial system 
and the specific type of regulatory change proposed. 
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When a financial industry group is targeted for regulation, the extent of its influence can 
be understood as conditional on two factors which interact: namely, the extent to which other 
interest groups are mobilized over the policy issue in question, and the extent to which the 
preferences of non-financial groups converge with those of financial industry groups. Figure 1 
below shows the variability of the predicted influence of a targeted financial industry group under 
different configurations of the mobilization and preferences of non-target groups. 
 
Figure 1: Expectations of Financial Industry Groups Power  
 
 Low mobilization of 
non-target groups 
High mobilization 
of non-target groups 
No Convergence of 
interests between 
targeted PFIGs and 
other groups 
(A) - 
 
(B) - - 
 
 
Convergence         
of interests between 
targeted PFIGs and 
other groups 
(C) + 
 
(D) ++ 
 
 
 As Figure 1 illustrates, the predicted influence of a targeted financial industry group over 
the policymaking process is at its greatest in those situations where non-target groups’ 
preferences converge with those of the targeted group, and when these non-target groups also 
mobilized around the issue (Quadrant D in Figure 1 below). On the contrary, a targeted groups’ 
influence over the policymaking process is at its lowest when the preferences of non-target 
groups are divergent and these groups mobilize to express these preferences to oppose or 
‘countervail’ the targeted group (Quadrant B).  
The left half of Figure 1 illustrates conditions that are more consistent with those 
described by the literature reviewed in the previous section, that is, when the mobilization of 
non-targeted actors is constrained. However, while in this case the impact of actor plurality on 
the influence of a targeted financial industry groups is less pronounced, the degree of 
convergence or conflict with the preferences of non-target groups is not inconsequential. When 
preferences converge but non-targeted actors’ don’t respond (Quadrant C), the targeted group 
may have a credible claim that the regulatory policy in question will affect more than just itself, 
16 
 
but given that its allies have not mobilized, it is unable to leverage the full extent of their 
resources. When there is no alignment in the interests of non-target and targeted groups 
(Quadrant A), the targeted group would not be able to make a credible claim regarding the 
dispersed consequences of not having their preferences met and it would be vulnerable to the 
contestation of policymakers defending broader societal concerns (see for instance, Seabrooke 
2006: 109). 
A number of factors are likely to influence the extent to which non-target groups 
actually mobilize. First, the plurality of actors is likely to be affected by the level of governance at 
which the financial regulatory policymaking occurs. In particular, the migration of regulatory 
policy design from the national level towards international bodies such as the International 
Accounting Standards Board (Nolke and Perry 2007) and the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision (Claessens Underhill and Zhang 2008), as well as the European level (Weber 2006; 
Mügge 2010) have been described as weakening the capacity of many interest groups to 
participate in the regulatory policymaking process as the asymmetries in the distribution of 
information and the organizational resources required to mobilize increase (Kahler and Lake 
2009; Mattli and Woods 2009). 
Second, the plurality of actors that mobilize around regulatory policies is likely to be 
influenced by the salience of regulatory policies. In this regard the mobilization of non-target 
groups has been described as more difficult during periods of “quiet politics” (Culpepper 2011), 
when financial regulation has little public salience and other groups may believe themselves to be 
at a disadvantage vis-a-vis the target group in understanding the distributional impact of highly 
technical regulatory policies (Baker 2010; Scholte 2013). In a similar vein, crises have been 
presented by the literature as favoring the mobilization of societal actors besides the targeted 
actors by producing a ‘demonstration effect’ which reveals the distributional implications of 
regulatory policies and opening new channels of access to the regulatory process (Mattli and 
Woods 2009).    
Third, the plurality of actors that mobilize around regulatory policies is likely to vary 
across different countries. In particular, the range of non-financial corporate actors directly 
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affected by changes in financial regulatory policies is likely to be higher in the most financialized 
economies where financial channels rather than trade and commodity production determine a 
higher share of the profits of non-financial firms (Krippner 2012). But important variations in 
the kind of mobilization of non-financial groups are likely to be influenced the specific structures 
of different national financial systems, with economies relying on bank-credit as the primary 
source of financing generating greater responses around regulations affecting the banking system 
and while countries more reliant on capital markets triggering a higher mobilization around 
policies to regulate financial actors active in these markets (Zysman 1983). 
This brief review of the factors influencing the mobilization of non-financial groups is by no 
means exclusive but it suggests that actor plurality in the financial regulatory policymaking is not 
static but may vary considerably even within the same policy domain. In the remaining section 
below we offer a range of qualitative, case-based evidence suggesting the importance of 
variations in actor plurality on the ability for regulated financial groups to influence the shape of 
financial regulatory policy. 
 
 
Section 4 - Empirical Evidence of Actor Plurality Affecting Outcomes 
 
Because of the dominant perception within the IPE literature regarding the limited 
plurality of financial regulatory policymaking, it is perhaps not surprising that coalitional 
dynamics in this domain have not been subject to much empirical scrutiny. In this section we 
illustrate the importance of actor plurality in shaping lobbying dynamics and regulatory outcomes 
by focusing on two key policy areas in international financial regulatory policymaking: banking 
and derivatives.  
While these areas have provided the empirical backbone for the vast majority of the 
recent theorizing on the politics of international financial regulation, existing studies have 
focused mostly on a narrow range of financial actors, primarily banks (for an exception see Clapp 
and Helleiner 2012) Using a range of qualitative evidence we engage in process tracing (George 
and Bennett 2005) to highlight how the influence of these groups directly targeted by the 
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regulation has been influenced by non-target groups, both within and outside the financial sector 
In other words, groups and dynamics often elided or neglected within the existing literature 
matter for actual regulatory policymaking outcomes and condition with influence of the targeted 
financial industry groups. We do so with explicit reference to the expectations regarding the 
impact of actor plurality over the influence of the financial industry groups targeted for 
regulation presented in the ‘leveraged interests’ approach presented above, although our analysis 
constitutes more of an illustration of mechanism at work than a discrete empirical ‘test’. Herein 
we are envisaging influence not as a deterministic relationship, but as a probabilistic one. As such 
evidence in favor of our argument would be that non-target groups’ mobilization is associated 
with different levels of target groups’ influence over the regulatory policymaking process in some 
way. 
Our qualitative evidence not only shows the importance of actor plurality in two key 
policy domains for the literature on financial regulation, but does so in a range of different 
contexts and periods. In particular, while the analysis of global banking regulation will focus on 
regulatory initiatives that preceded the crisis, the analysis of derivatives regulation will focus 
primarily on the regulatory response to the crisis. Moreover, while the analysis in both areas will 
focus primarily on the policymaking process at the national and regional level, the evidence 
presented in this section illustrate how a plurality of interest groups nested at the national level 
can have important consequences on global regulatory outcomes. 
 
Global Banking Regulation in Germany and in the United States  
The Basel II Capital Accord represented the central international regulatory agreement 
for banking regulation prior to the global financial crisis. Developed by the Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision, at the heart of the Accord was an attempt to generate banking regulatory 
standards whereby the amount of risk was correlated with the amount of regulatory capital a 
bank would have to hold. An extensive literature has built up around the formation of Basel II, 
often citing the ability of banks and banking associations to ‘capture’ the Basel Committee 
through various lobbying practices, to the exclusion of other business groups (Helleiner and 
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Porter 2010; Wood 2005; Tsingou 2008; Lall 2012; Young 2012). What is often elided in this 
literature however is the fact that a significant number of groups who mobilized were not banks 
at all, but rather groups that were not the targets of the regulation but who had concerns 
regarding  the downstream costs of the regulation.5 
 The case of German banks’ lobbying efforts during the formation of Basel II is 
illustrative of the importance of the non-target groups in affecting regulatory policy outcomes. 
Soon after the release of the draft of the Accord in 1999, the German banking community and its 
particular the formal peak association composed of the five national banking associations in the 
country (the ZKA, or ‘Zentraler Kreditauschuss’) began an active campaign of mobilization, 
raising concerns to their regulators about how the new system of risk sensitivity implied in the 
methodology would adversely affect lending to the Mittelstand, the small and medium-enterprises 
(SMEs) which formed the backbone of the German economy. The German banking community 
was able to secure broad access to policymakers, but their demands were not heeded by the 
German regulators who sat on the Basel Committee, who rejected the notion of adjusting an 
international financial agreement to ensure sector-specific protection for a class of firms 
(Bundestag 2000a; 2000b, 54-55; Interview with former senior German financial regulator, Berlin, 
15 April 2009). Such a situation can be understood in the context of quadrant C in Figures 1 and 
4 above; the banking groups were able to rely on the figure of the ‘Mittelstand’ to bolster their 
arguments but they mobilized largely alone. 
This configuration of private sector lobbying in Germany soon entered a second phase 
as the details of the Basel II Accord became more concrete. Rather than the business community 
being simply invoked within bankers’ arguments to policymakers, now non-financial sector groups 
within the business community became actively mobilized over the issue, such as the National 
Federation of Industry (the BDI, or Bundesverband der deutscher Industrie), the Association of 
German Crafts (the ZDH, or the Zentralverband der Deutschen Handwerks), and the German 
Federation of Industry and Commerce (DIHK, or the Deutscher Industrie and 
                                                             
5 In fact, just over half of the respondent letters to the Basel II consultation (those who were not 
individuals) came from outside the banking industry, with 32% from within finance but outside the 
banking industry (what we have called ‘sectoral cohabitants’ above), 13% from business groups outside the 
financial industry altogether, and 5 and 1% from research institutes and NGOs, respectively. 
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Handelskammerstag). Such groups feared forthcoming damage to lines of credit to SMEs a result 
of Basel II’s particular content when it came to business lending. 
These groups communicated their concerns not only to the Bundesbank (the German 
central bank) and BaKred (the German Financial Supervisory Authority), but also to members of 
the Bundestag, using their well-developed network to make their views known and provide MPs 
with information on the issue. 6 Each of these business associations capitalized on the fact that 
SME promotion was often framed as the foundation for German economic recovery and 
innovation at the time, and were able to spread their message to journalists and politicize the 
issue as one of a global agreement damaging German small business, rather than simply 
damaging bank profits. Banks and the rest of the business community worked together. Both 
groups regularly exchanged information, and worked together to articulate their concerns to the 
Ministry of Finance, the BaKred and the Bundesbank. Several members of the ZKA even joined 
committees within the ZDH in order to encourage a consolidated effort, and private sector 
groups in this network also reached out to other business associations, such as the Central 
Committee of Electricians (ZVE, Zentralverband des Elektrohandwerks).7  
While German regulators continued to put up some resistance, the extensive network of 
business mobilization throughout the country ignited considerable interest and sympathy from 
the Ministry for the Economy, the Ministry of Finance, and most importantly the Finance 
Committee within the Bundestag. This produced an all-party resolution mandating the German 
Basel Committee to ensure a positive overall result for the German SME sector, leading to an 
increase in credit to German firms (Bundestag 2001). When the German regulators failed to swiftly 
deliver the desired changes to the Accord, the bank-business coalition stepped up their 
mobilization even further, using their combined network of Chambers of Commerce to target 
MPs during an election year. Reflecting the widespread public efforts, the German Chancellor, 
Gerhard Schröder, threatened publicly to veto the translation of Basel II into European law 
unless significant changes were made (Engelen 2002:97). As a result of the widespread 
                                                             
6 Interviews with representatives from various private sector associations, Berlin, 1 August, 4 October 
2007. 
7 Interview with ZDH representative, 4 October 2007.  
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politicization of the Accord in Germany, the Basel Committee was effectively compelled to 
adopt in July 2002 an ‘SME package’ which allowed banks to set aside less regulatory capital 
against loans to SMEs compared with loans to large corporations (BCBS 2002). The private 
sector coalition of banking and business associations achieved their goal, and achieved significant 
gains as a result (Fabi et. al. 2005:521). 
 As the variation within the development of Basel II lobbying and SMEs illustrates, non-
target actors improved the strength of the lobbying efforts first spearheaded by German banks, 
the group being regulated. Yet the mobilization of German banking associations was a necessary 
but insufficient condition to achieve a policy reversal by the German regulators, and thus actual 
policy change at the international, Basel Committee, level. Instead, it was the combined 
mobilization of business and crafts associations which generated the groundswell of politicized 
opposition which enabled the desired policy change, denoted by the shift from quadrant C to D 
in Figure 2 below. 
 
Figure 2: Non-Target Mobilization in the Basel II Accord 
 Low mobilization of 
non-target groups 
High mobilization 
of non-target groups 
No Convergence of 
interests between 
targeted PFIGs and 
other groups 
(A) 
 
(B) 
US Mortgage Insurance 
Companies Mobilized 
Against Banks’ 
Efforts. 
Convergence         
of interests between 
targeted PFIGs and 
other groups 
(C) 
German banks achieved 
some modest concessions, 
but did not achieve their 
central aim. 
(D) 
With a bank-business 
coalition, German 
banks achieved 
extensive policy gains. 
 
 
An important instance of lobbying in the United States over the same global regulatory 
Accord reveals the opposite dynamic at work. While residential real estate had always been an 
area of the Basel II Accord which was treated relatively favorably by the Basel Committee, after 
conducting more research into banks’ own internal risk practices, the Committee decided that 
certain conservative safeguards should be put in place, especially since mortgage activity was 
understood to be cyclical in nature, and because residential mortgages were such a large part of 
banks’ portfolios.  
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US banks did not take too kindly to this conservative change in the international 
agreement, as they feared constraints on their booming mortgage business. A variety of large US 
banks such as US Bancorp, JP Morgan Chase, Washington Mutual, Fleet, Wells Fargo and 
Citigroup took on the issue, and were all particularly vocal about what they perceived to be an 
irrational and arbitrary move by the Basel Committee. These banks coalesced into a variety of 
associations, such the American Bankers’ Association, the Financial Services Roundtable, the 
Mortgage Bankers’ Association, the Risk Management Association, and even formed a new 
group calling itself the Consumer Mortgage Coalition, a Washington-based advocacy group 
organized by the mortgage banking divisions of JPMorgan Chase, Citigroup, and Wells Fargo 
(American Bankers Association 2003:3; Financial Services Roundtable 2003:9; Consumer 
Mortgage Coalition 2003:3). Through detailed and well coordinated work within these 
associations, US banks generated a series of highly technical arguments critiquing the Basel 
Committee’s residential mortgage policies (see in particular Risk Management Association Capital 
Group 2003:63). US banks had excellent access to their regulators and chief Basel Committee 
members, the US Federal Reserve and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), and 
engaged with them during a period where Congress was highly critical of US regulators’ 
involvement in the Basel Committee and highly sympathetic to banks’ concerns (e.g. FOIA 
2004a).8 Sensitive to the concerns of their domestic constituency and an often highly politicized 
line of business (homeownership), the Fed began investigating the empirical dimensions of 
bankers’ claims.  
Yet just as this process began, another private sector group representing a specific 
segment of the insurance industry stood up to the lobbying plate. Specifically, the Mortgage 
Insurance Companies of America (MICA) began conducting its own research into the 
consequences of Basel II’s mortgage model for its constituents’ interests, even through it’s own 
activities were not being regulated by Basel II. As the actors on the other side of banks’ mortgage 
risks, insurance companies had a very different take on mortgage risks than bankers did. In 
contrast to the banking community, the MICA argued strongly that the assumptions of the Basel 
                                                             
8 Interviews with numerous private sector groups and regulators, New York and Washington, July-August 
2008. 
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Committee regarding the correlation in the default of residential mortgages were too permissive 
and did not reflect the additional risk associated with residential mortgage lending – a position 
they bolstered with detailed quantitative evidence (MICA 2003a:2-3, 9; MICA 2003b:10; FOIA 
2004b).  
MICA did not just argue their case to the US regulators, but also actively argued against 
the arguments that large US banks and their associations were making, stating that banks were 
offering a distorted picture of mortgage risk (MICA 2003b:12). US regulators not only heeded 
these arguments, but actively worked with this group to assess the kind of technical arguments 
banks were making at the time (Calem and Follain 2003:15-16; FOIA 2004b:4). The fact that the 
data provided by this insurance group had both greater depth and greater time coverage than the 
ones provided by the banking industry undermined the credibility of bankers’ technical claims. 
While the Fed was initially open to the possibility of adjusting the policy in light of empirical 
evidence, they now became affirmed in the Basel Committee’s overall approach. Thus in this case 
the mobilization of a non-target group with divergent preferences within the same financial 
industry weakened the influence of the group directly targeted by the regulation in question – the 
situation described in quadrant B of Figure 2  above. 
 
The Regulation of OTC Derivatives Markets in the US and Europe 
Evidence for leveraged interests at work can also be seen in the attempts to re-regulate 
financial markets and institutions since the global financial crisis. Exemplary in this regard are the 
international attempts to regulate the derivatives industry. The regulation of derivatives markets 
has been frequently explained through the activity of the small number of large banking 
institutions that dominate the trading of these products. This had not always been the case. In 
particular US farmers and other agricultural interests who use derivatives to hedge fluctuations in 
the price of agricultural products had been active since the emergence of the agricultural futures 
markets in Chicago in the nineteenth century in demanding the curbing of speculative activities 
(Clapp and Helleiner 2012). However, the influence of these non-financial interests had 
decreased since the 1980s as the relative importance exchange-based transactions in favour of 
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trades occurring bilaterally among financial institutions, or “over the counter”. A number of 
existing IPE scholarship has highlighted how in the decade before the crisis banks dominating 
these markets had succeeded in keeping the OTC markets outside of the direct oversight of 
regulators in the US and elsewhere through a combination of lobbying and self-regulatory 
initiatives designed by financial industry groups such as the ISDA (Tsingou 2006; Morgan 2010; 
McKeen-Edwards and Porter 2013).  
The crisis of 2008-2010 has marked a turning point in the regulation of OTC derivatives. 
Association of these products with high profile episodes of financial instability triggered a change 
of attitude in the international regulatory community, culminated in the agreement of the G20 
leaders to force part of these markets onto central counterparties and regulated exchanges in 
order to boost standardization and transparency (Helleiner 2010). Leading the charge in seeking 
to constrain the extent of these measures were those banking groups that were the primary target 
of this international agreement and who had in the past successfully lobbied the US Congress to 
exempt OTC derivatives markets from the purview of federal regulators with the Commodity 
Futures Modernization Act of 2000. However, unlike in the past, the capacity of these 
institutions to influence to shape the regulation was affected by the unprecedented plurality of 
groups mobilizing around derivatives regulation within the US Congress. 9  Banks found 
themselves colliding with old opponents both within the financial sector, such as those 
exchanges which stood to benefit from new business due to the regulatory changes (Helleiner 
2010), as well as outside finance, such as agricultural interests now in coalition with other firms 
from the food and energy sectors, consumer advocacy groups, NGOs, and different faith-based 
organizations (Clapp and Helleiner 2012).  
However, a more novel development has been the mobilization of a large number of 
non-financial corporates using derivatives to hedge their commercial risks. Unlike agricultural 
interests calling for more stringent regulation of commodity derivatives, these firms have mostly 
mobilized in opposition to a number of aspects of the existing legislative proposals. A leadership 
                                                             
9 Lobbying disclosure forms reveal how the number of nonfinancial companies and associations lobbying 
the US Congress over derivatives grew more than tenfold between the years immediately before the crisis 
and 2009 (Scannell 2009).  
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role in soliciting this mobilization in the US was played by the US Chamber of Commerce, which 
even before the unveiling of the legislative proposal by the US Treasury started to collect data 
regarding the use of derivatives among its members (Master 2009; US Chamber of Commerce 
2009). Most importantly, the US Chamber of Commerce played a strategic role in organizing an 
ad hoc coalition of non-financial corporate actors calling themselves the “Coalition for 
Derivatives End-Users” which included firms such as Ford Motor Company, General Electric, 
IBM, Apple and Boeing, and leading trade associations from the manufacturing sector (e.g. 
National Association of Manufacturers), real estate sector (e.g. The National Association of Real 
Estate Investment Trusts, the Real Estate Roundtable), and energy sector (e.g. Edison Electric 
Institute, the American Petroleum Institute, American Gas Association). The Coalition launched 
an extensive campaign, writing to all members of Congress to demand that the most onerous 
requirements imposed by the new regulation of derivatives, including the trading requirement, 
should not be extended to those corporate actors who used derivatives to reduce commercial risk 
and volatility in their normal business operations (Coalition for Derivatives End-Users 2009). 
The demands from corporate end-users of derivatives were opposed within Congress only by a 
small number of groups. In particular, a newly created coalition of consumer, labor, and small 
business organization named Americans for Financial Reforms argued in front of the US 
Congress that the legislation posed on corporate end-users “pale in comparison to costs that this 
crisis has inflicted on society, and even on their own firms”, while granting them exemptions 
created “the risk of creating loopholes large enough to fly a jet aircraft through” (Americans for 
Financial Reform 2009). 
The mobilization of corporate end-users in the regulation of derivatives has not been 
limited to the US but it has also spread to Europe, where several large European non-financial 
started to lobby the European Commission when this followed in the footstep of US authorities 
in proposing a similar regulatory framework for OTC derivatives. Here 164 companies across a 
wide number of sectors and countries joined the European Association of Corporate Treasurers, 
a grouping of 20 national associations representing treasury professionals, to warn that if Europe 
had followed the US lead this would have led to “a reduction in the amount of funds allocated to 
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productive investment in the [European] economy and less use of prudent hedging to eliminate 
market risks, with a resulting increase in uncertainty and volatility in the real economy of 
Europe” (EACT 2010, see also Raeburn 2009). These groups of corporate derivatives end-users 
in Europe and in the US have also at different times joined forces in jointly lobbying regulators at 
the international level (Coalition-EACT 2012).  
This mobilization of non-financial corporate end-users had some immediate 
repercussions over the lobbying strategy of banks and other financial groups active in the 
derivatives markets. In a moment in which the severity of the crisis had severely tarnished their 
political capital, banks explicitly sought to align their interests with those of their corporate 
customers. The Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association, for instance, justified its 
plea in front of the US Congress to limit the scope of the legislation on the basis that this would 
reflect not only the interests of the financial services firms that constitute its membership but 
also of the “interests and concerns of those firms’ customers, the thousands of American 
corporations that benefit directly from the broad availability of derivatives transactions to 
manage various risks that arise in connection with their day-to-day business activities” (SIFMA 
2009). ISDA published research in June 2010 revealing that the legislation which was being 
finalized by the US Congress would cost US companies as much as $1 trillion in terms of capital 
requirements (ISDA 2010).  
Indeed, the Congressional leaders who had been shepherding the legislation through 
Congress saw in these claims an attempt by banks to “tak[e] the end users in effect as hostages to 
get out from under some of these requirements” (Barney Frank, cited by Paletta 2010). Also US 
regulators sought to split the coalition emerging between dealers and commercial end-users, with 
the Chairman of the CFTC Gary Gensler arguing that 3 million business represented by the US 
Chamber of Commerce were mislead by a “few big banks” which had an interest in keeping their 
transactions with end-users off exchanges to preserve their information advantage vis-à-vis their 
customers (Gensler 2010).  
In the end, the claims advanced by corporate end-users and the banks regarding the 
impact of the regulation on derivatives in terms of employment resonated more with elected 
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officials in the US and Europe than the concerns expressed from regulators  regarding the risks 
that granting exemptions to corporate end-users could create loopholes exploited by financial 
institutions. Both the Dodd-Frank Bill approved by the US Congress in July 2010 and the 
regulation the regulation initially proposed by the European Commission in June 2010 made 
special exemptions for how non-financial companies were to be treated, including the 
requirement to have their derivatives traded on regulated exchanges. Shortly after, the principle 
that corporate end-users could be exempted from the same clearing requirements was also 
inscribed in the international regulatory agenda by the Financial Stability Board (FSB 2010), 
which tasked the International Organization of Securities to monitor and coordinate these 
exemptions (IOSCO 2012). 
The fact derivatives transactions occurring between financial institutions were not granted the 
same regulatory relief as those transactions having corporate end-users as one counterparty is 
indicative of the greater political capital that the latter group enjoyed during this period. 
However, the major banks were nonetheless able to benefit by the mobilization of corporate 
end-users. In fact, corporate end-users joined the financial institutions in opposing different 
measures which targeted banks exclusively but which had knock-on effects for corporates. The 
mobilization of corporate end-users against proposals introduced within the US Congress to limit 
the capacity of banks to trade customized derivatives outside of regulated exchanges (Coalition 
for Derivatives End-Users 2009), or forcing dealers to spin off their swaps trading desks in 
independently capitalized entities (Coalition for Derivatives End-Users, 2010) granted credibility 
to the claims advanced by the financial industry regarding the impact of these legislative 
proposals on the broader economy. As Congressman Barney Frank stated within Congress 
regarding the proposals to limit the trading of credit derivatives to those market actors with an 
underlying liability to insure: “When we first began to talk about this… I did not expect people in 
the business of selling these, people in the financial industry, to be happy with that. They weren’t 
… We didn’t care whether they were or weren’t. What we began to hear were objections to some 
of this from those people for whom derivatives are not an end for making money as they are for 
the financial institutions, but a means so that they can go about their business of producing 
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goods and services with some stability, with some reasonable expectation about cost.” (US 
House of Representatives 2009: 2).  
Ultimately, the joint opposition from banks and their non-financial customers towards 
those measures that would have significantly curtailed the market for credit derivatives 
contributed towards the watering down or abandoning of these proposals within Congress. This 
victory for the major banks (a situation depicted in quadrant D in Figure 3 below) stands in 
contrast with the treatment of commodity derivatives, where the opposition from agricultural 
and other commodity firms undermined the attempts of the banks to veto the introduction of 
severe position limits (a situation depicted in quadrant B in Figure 3 below) (Clapp and Helleiner 
2012).  
 
 
Figure 3: Non-Target Group Mobilization in the Regulation of Derivatives 
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In a nutshell, the analysis of derivatives regulation illustrates how, on the one hand, the financial 
crisis has expanded the plurality of actors shaping the regulatory response that emerged after the 
crisis, and on the other hand that this mobilization has worked in the regulated industry’s favor. 
While the area of derivatives regulation is a particularly vivid area for the dynamic we wish to 
point out, it is by no means exhaustive of the instances in which actor plurality has had an 
important impact over regulatory policy since the crisis. For example, non-financial companies 
from different sectors such as retail, energy and medical research organized by the US Chamber 
of Commerce have mobilized in opposition to other aspects of the Dodd-Frank Act, such as the 
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provision in the US legislation limiting the proprietary trading activities in the federally-insured 
banking institutions (so-called Volcker Rule) (Abbott Laboratories et al. 2012, Thakor 2012), as 
well as the creation of a Consumer Financial Protection Agency (US Chamber of Commerce 
2010). The regulation of hedge fund industry in Europe generated critical voices not only from 
the hedge funds targeted for regulation also pension funds and charitable foundations (including 
the Church of England) which in recent years had increased their investments in the industry 
(EFRP 2009, Jones 2009). Within banking, some of the most successful bank lobbying 
campaigns – waged both at the international level and within key jurisdictions such as the EU - 
have involved the rules associated with trade finance. A focus on bank lobbying misses important 
dimensions to this process, as banks and banking associations have worked alongside 
international business associations, such as the International Chamber of Commerce (BCBS 
2011; ICC 2009; Senechal 2011; Bland 2013). In each of these cases, the mobilization of these 
non-target groups has played an important role in allowing different financial industries targeted 
for new regulations to extract important concessions just when the crisis had weakened their 
political capital (for a more general discussion, see Pagliari and Young 2013). 
  
 
 
Conclusion  
 
Charles Lindblom (1977) famously argued that in modern democracies the business 
community cannot be treated as just another special interest group. In the same way, the analysis 
presented in this paper supports the notion that financial industry groups are not just another 
special interest group within the business community. However, what distinguish the politics of 
financial services regulation from other areas of the global political economy are not simply the 
elements identified by most analyses of financial industry power, such as the resources deployed 
by the financial industry, the nature of the institutional context within financial regulatory policies 
are designed, or the sheer size of the financial sector in the economy. Rather, our analysis points 
to the importance of the complex web of relations that derive from the location of the financial 
sector in the economy.  
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Using quantitative and qualitative evidence we have demonstrated that financial 
regulatory policymaking is a much more plural place than the existing IPE literature has specified. 
New global banking regulations generate mobilization not only from banks, but also from non-
target groups such as industrial lobbies, crafts associations and the insurance industry. Regulating 
that most obscure of financial wizardry, complex derivatives, elicits not just the lobbying 
reactions of the banking industry that issue derivatives, but also all the many firms that utilize 
these financial products for their daily business operations, from manufacturing firms to chain 
restaurants. This analysis opens a number of questions and avenues for future research. More 
research is needed to understand the sources of the plurality of business groups mobilizing 
around financial regulatory policies, as well as the preferences and strategies of non-financial 
business groups engaged in financial regulatory debates. The analysis in this paper has only taken 
a preliminary step towards unpacking this plurality and better understanding how it may affect 
the financial regulatory policymaking process and its outcomes Future work might explore the 
conditions under which actor plurality might be more or less likely, along the lines of what we set 
out at the end of Section 2.   
Plurality not only exists; it also matters for policy outcomes. Small business, crafts, and 
industrial associations can reinforce the lobbying efforts by powerful banking and derivatives 
industry associations by providing complementary political connections as well as enhanced 
credibility to their claims regarding the broader costs of regulation. Financial industry groups 
have been able to ‘leverage’ their influence over the policymaking process by working alongside 
non-target groups which often share their same preferences.  
At the same time, our approach suggests that this conditioning is not uni-directional. 
While the mobilization of non-target groups can represent an accelerant to financial industry 
groups lobbying power, in other cases actor plurality can turn into an Achilles’ heel. The 
mobilization of groups inside the financial industry, such as mortgage insurers, and outside of it, 
such as agricultural interests, may limit the influence of financial industry groups targeted by 
regulation by providing detailed empirical data to regulators or lobbying aggressively 
policymakers more favorable to their claims. In the same way as leverage is a source of 
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vulnerability in the financial world, also in the policymaking universe this plurality comes with 
risks such as the creation of countervailing coalitions.  
Our argument is not that plurality is the single key to understanding financial industry 
power. It is one important, and often neglected factor in a multifarious set of factors that are 
often well spelled out in the IPE literature, and the contribution of this analysis should be seen as 
complementary to these analyses. However, the emphasis on actor plurality offered here does 
provide a corrective to the tendency of the existing literature of regarding financial industry 
influence over regulatory policymaking as consistent and systematic. Future scholarship needs to 
create room for greater variation in the influence of financial industry groups, and a greater 
sensitivity to the often plural politics of global finance allows for a more contingent and nuanced 
understanding of financial industry influence. 
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Appendix - List of Governance Institutions in the Dataset  
 
Institution Country 
Agricultural Marketing Service US 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision International 
Bundestag Committee for Economics and Technology Germany 
Bundestag Committee for Health Germany 
Bundestag Committee for the Environment Germany 
Bundestag Finance Committee  Germany 
Bureau of Land Management US 
Canadian National Energy Board Canada 
Canadian Ad Hoc Working Group of Provincial Securities 
Administrators 
Canada 
Canadian Competition Bureau Canada 
Canadian Provincial Securities Regulators Canada 
Canadian Council of Insurance Regulation Canada 
Commodity Credit Corporation US 
Commodity Futures Trading Commission US 
Committee for Payments and Settlement Systems International 
Conference of European Securities Regulators 
European Banking Authority 
EU 
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau US 
Department of Energy and Climate Change UK 
Department of Health UK 
Environmental Protection Agency  
European Commission DG Agriculture and Rural 
Development 
EU 
European Commission DG Competition EU 
European Commission DG Energy EU 
European Commission DG Enterprise and Industry EU 
European Commission DG Fisheries EU 
European Commission DG General Taxation and Customs EU 
European Commission DG Health and Consumers EU 
European Commission DG Internal Market EU 
European Commission DG Information Society EU 
European Commission Special Task force on Media and 
Publishing 
EU 
European Commission Radio Policy Spectrum Group EU 
European Securities and Markets Authority EU 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation US 
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission US 
Federal Housing Finance Agency US 
Federal Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration US 
Federal Reserve System US 
Financial Stability and Oversight Council US 
Food and Drug Administration  US 
Food Safety and Inspection Service US 
Food Standards Agency UK 
Grain Inspection Packers and Stockyards Administration US 
Health Canada Canada 
House of Lords Committee on Energy and Commerce UK 
House of Lords European Union Committee UK 
House of Lords Science and Technology Committee UK 
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Housing and Urban Development US 
Industry Canada Canada 
International Organization of Securities Commissions International 
Joint Forum on Financial Conglomerates International 
Northern Ireland Food Standards Agency UK 
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency US 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development International 
Office of Thrift Supervision US 
Rural Business Cooperative Service US 
Scottish Food Standards Agency UK 
Security and Exchange Commission US 
Small Business Administration US 
UN Office of the Commissioner for Human Rights International 
World Health Organization International 
 
   
